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I. INTRODUCTION
Living the American dream, held so dear by so many for so long, has
always included receiving the best medical care money can buy. In the
case of Medicare patients, it is government money that is being spent to
give older Americans quality health care at an age when they often need
it the most. There is a direct correlation between aging and increased
utilization of health services.1 In a country where the "younger" old are
using medical resources which originally were thought to be reserved for
the "older" old,2 what will happen by the time the so-called "baby boom-
ers" reach the golden age of retirement? Faced with Medicare expendi-
tures increasing at an alarming rate, the government was determined to
do something about it. It obviously could not stop patients from seeking
medical care, and equally obviously it could not require all the private
physicians practicing medicine throughout the United States to reduce
medical expenses. Instead, it determined to restrain hospitals and hold
them accountable for the rising cost of health care.
While certainly a contributor to the problem of rising health care costs,
the hospital industry cannot be blamed solely for the medical malaise
I Eisenberg & Williams, Cost Containment and Changing Physician's Practice
Behavior, 246 J. A.M.A. 2195 (1985).
2 The term "younger" old has found its way into the literature to describe
individuals in their early retirement years, generally ages 65 up to 80. The "older"
old are generally defined as individuals over 80. As life expectancy has increased,
individuals in their 60's many times find themselves caring for a parent in their
80's.
Sullivan & Moore, A Critical Look at Recent Developments in Tax Exempt
Hospitals, 23 J. HEALTH & Hosp. L. 65 (1990) [hereinafter Sullivan].
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which grips America today. Health care costs account for one of every
eight dollars of the Gross National Product (GNP).4 This is double that
of Japan and fifty percent higher than other developed countries.6 Despite
this, Americans still cannot get many services they need or want. Busi-
ness and government combined pay for more than 80 percent of health
care bills.6 So it has fallen to big business and the government to put the
brakes on the runaway train. Despite all efforts, "costs proved intractable
and services remained inconvenient and variable in quality."7 What went
wrong? Why is it that although we have vastly improved our ability to
diagnose, monitor, cure and account for the cost of each and every disease,
the ills of the industry persist? These ills persist despite an aging pop-
ulation which has created a "whole sub industry of geriatric care",, and
despite the fact that women, who are the prime consumers of health care,
have joined the work force in burgeoning numbers, thus raising family
incomes. Why has the Federal government failed to solve a problem which
it has literally been throwing money and human resources at for years?
One effort on the part of government and some political leaders to
curtail health care costs over the last decade has been the introduction
of the Medicare and Medicaid Fraud and Abuse statutes and their coun-
terpart, the safe harbor regulations.9 Although yet to be enacted in final
form, the proposed safe harbor regulations, and some recent case law,
have given those involved in health care delivery systems reason to pause,
reassess and ponder what lies ahead.
This Note will determine whether the safe harbor regulations, intended
to advise hospitals of permissible conduct, have instead created a chilling
effect on the competitive market place. Have governmental regulations,
in the form of safe harbors, failed to produce clear answers and guidance
to hospitals? It would appear that instead of clarifying the issues, these
new proposed safe harbor regulations have, in fact, prevented hospitals
from offering patients and the federal government cost savings in the
form of discounts and rebates.
II. BACKGROUND
Prior to the 1983 Medicare Prospective Payment System, Congress had
revised the fraud and abuse provisions of the Social Security Act.10 This
4Herzlinger, The Failed Revolution in Health Care - The Role of Management,
HARV. Bus. REV., Mar.-Apr. 1989, at 95.
5Id.
4 See id. at 96.7 Id.
8Id.
9 See generally MacKelvie & McGuire, Fraud, Abuse & Inurement: The Grow-
ing Impact on Provider-Physician Relations, 23 J. HEALTH & Hosp. L. 1 (1990)
[hereinafter MacKelviel.
11 Pub. L. No. 92-603, § 242(b), 86 Stat. 1329, 1419 (1972). These provisions
prohibited the solicitation, offering, paying, or accepting of kickbacks or bribes
in connection with the provision of services or items under the Medicare/Medicaid
Program.
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revision occurred in 1972 and it was again revised in 1977.11 The end
result was that Congress authorized the imposition of criminal sanctions
for "knowingly and willfully" defrauding the Medicare or Medicaid pro-
grams. The statute states: "Whoever knowingly and willfully makes or
causes to be made any false statement or representation of a material
fact in any application for any benefit or payment under this subchapter
. . ." is guilty of fraud. 12 These criminal sanctions included a maximum
fine of $25,000 and/or imprisonment of up to five years.1 3 Congress then
carved out an exception to these amendments which excluded discounts
or price reductions which are disclosed and passed on to the patient and
third party payor.
14
The original purpose of this fraud and abuse legislation was to curtail
the activities of "Medicaid mills," storefront purveyors of substandard
health services, who shared their gross profits, via a percentage lease,
with their landlords.16 Congress also sought to catch freestanding labs,
nursing homes and independent practitioners participating in kickback
schemes in this net. Fraud was defined as "intentional misrepresenta-
tion."16 Implicit in the definition describing misuse and abuse was the
notion that no fraud existed if a provider used "sound medical practices,"'17
as defined by existing medical community standards.
Legislative history further indicates Congressional intent was such
that if an action did not cost the Medicare program an excessive amount
of money, it should not fall under the fraud and abuse section of the law.
In the legislative history, providers were encouraged to seek discounts to
save the Medicare program money. 8
" Medicare & Medicaid Antifraud and Abuse Amendments. Pub. L. No. 95-
142,91 Stat. 1179 (1977) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395 (1982)). These amendments
broadened prohibited conduct to include the offer, payment, solicitation, or receipt
of any remuneration in order to induce business reimbursed under the Medicare/
Medicaid Programs.
1242 U.S.C. § 1395 nn (a)(1).
13 Biros, Joint Venture Safe Harbors: Avoiding Prosecutorial Attack, FEDN AM.
HEALTH SYs. REV., Jan.-Feb. 1989, at 21.
14Kadzielski, Joint Ventures: Beyond the Safe Harbors, HEALTH PROGRESS, May
1989, at 70. The Medicare and Medicaid Patient and Program Protection Act
(Public Law 100-93) required the Department of Health and Human Services to
prepare regulations which enumerated practices which would not be viewed as
criminal offenses under the Social Security Act.
16 See AM. Hosp. Assoc., SELECT LEGAL ADVISORY COMM. ON MEDICARE, OFFICE
OF LEGAL & REG. AFFAIRS, FEB. 1985, No. 2, at 3 (Feb. 1985) [hereinafter AM.
Hosp. Assoc.].
16 H.R. REP. No. 393, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 3050 (1977).
17 Id.
18 Medicare and Medicaid Patient and Program Protection Act (MMPPPA).
Pub. L. No. 100-93, 101 Stat. 680 (1987). The MMPPPA required the Department
of Health & Human Services to promulgate regulations specifying those practices
which would not be subject to prosecution. That requirement is the genesis of the
"safe harbor" regulations.
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The Select Legal Advisory Committee on Medicare, which concerns
itself with the legislative intent of Congress, outlined several consider-
ations a hospital should review prior to instituting a new hospital activity
in a 1985 memorandum:
1. Does the activity comply with accepted medical practices
and is it a reasonable and legitimate medical activity?
2. Does the activity increase the cost of Medicare or Medicaid
programs by allowing the provider to bill the programs twice
for the same treatment?
3. Does payment for the activity depend on a percentage ar-
rangement or on the number of Medicare patients seen? 9
An affirmative answer to the first question and a negative answer to
the second and third questions reduces the likelihood of a violation of the
fraud and abuse statutes. The American Hospital Association's (AHA)
Select Legal Advisory Committee on Medicare proceeded to analyze var-
ious situations which might fall under the purview of the Antifraud and
Abuse Amendments.2 0 While these are opinions only and not to be con-
strued as specific legal advice, they do begin to outline a framework from
which one can chart a course.
Amid these hypotheticals there is the additional caveat that a separate
assessment should be made regarding payment antitrust reimbursement
and tax issues. The committee notes the Internal Revenue Service's (IRS)
historic opposition to 501(c)(3) 21 participation in joint ventures or part-
nerships. However, in the early 1980's the IRS indicated approval of such
arrangements unless they benefited hospital staff in a transaction not
made at arm's length. Specific examples were cited:
1. Physician received a disproportionate allocation of profits.
2. Hospital made unreasonable loans.
3. Real estate owned by hospital sold or leased at less than
fair market value.
4. Hospital not properly compensated for its contribution to
the arrangement.
22
And, in 1983 and 1984, the IRS issued private letter rulings stating that
joint ventures between staff physicians and the hospital had no adverse
impact on the hospital's tax-exempt status.2
19 AM. Hosp. Assoc., supra note 15, at 6-7.
20 Id. at 7-19. The AHA mentioned staff privilege fees, percentage of revenue
leases, physician incentive payments, bed reservation premiums, hospital dis-
counts, and captive referrals to name a few.
11 I.R.C. § 501(C)(3) (1986). This subchapter deals with organizations deemed
exempt from taxation because of a religious, charitable, scientific or educational
purpose.
22 AM. Hosp. Assoc., supra note 15, at 7-8.
- Id. at 8.
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III. POTENTIAL FOR FRAUD AND ABUSE
The Committee went on to outline situations wherein there might be
a potential for fraud and abuse based on the Medicare/Medicaid Amend-
ments. The committee appeared to indicate that these practices, while
falling outside of the safe harbors, should be considered legitimate busi-
ness practices.
1. One situation describes a hospital which charges the doctor
a flat fee for the use of the hospital facility, staff, or supplies.
This might constitute a payment in return for patient ref-
erral, in that the Doctor in question might be denied ref-
errals if he or she had no access to the hospital. However,
if the physician were hospital-based, the hospital would not
be the source of referrals but rather other physicians would
be, thus eliminating the potential for abuse.
2. A hospital Radiology department is an example of a hospital
charging a hospital-based physician a percentage of the de-
partmental revenues for an exclusive lease. A potential
problem could arise if the payments to the hospital were
directly related to the hospital's referral of patients to that
physician. The leasing fee must be reasonable, and sound
business practices must be followed to exempt this situation
from the fraud and abuse provision.
3. Physicians are sometimes given an incentive to reduce hos-
pital utilization of inpatients. This is generally not consid-
ered a violation because it is a reasonable business practice
and reduces costs to Medicare. A Medicare fraud and abuse
violation could be alleged if it could be shown that more
patients were being admitted for shorter time frames. How-
ever, this situation is generally considered a positive incen-
tive to reduce utilization, which is a goal of the Medicare
Prospective Payment System. Some hospitals go so far as
to offer non-financial benefits to physicians who reduce their
patients' utilization of in-patient hospitalization.
4. A discount of an office lease could be construed as a pay
back for referring a patient to the landlord hospital. As long
as there is no specific obligation on the part of the physician
to refer his patients to the landlord hospital, it is unlikely
that a successful complaint could be brought. If, however,
the referral arrangement were more explicit, it is possible
that a violation might be charged. An exception is made in
rural areas where a guarantee of a percentage of salary is
sometimes necessary to secure a physician for small com-
munities. 24
24Letter from D. Nicholson, Director of the Office of Program Integrity, De-
partment of Health, Education and Welfare (October, 1978). See generally, J.
Stiller, Legal Boundaries in Physician Recruitment Practices, Hose. MED STAFF,
Sept. 1981, at 25-29.
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5. A hospital sometimes pays a premium to a long-term care
facility to reserve beds. While meeting with mixed reviews,
this practice seems to be viewed as an innovative use of
health care resources and not an abuse of the system. While
regulations prevent providers from charging Medicare for
reserving these beds, if no attempt is made to bill Medicare,
then this situation is viewed as making economic sense;
especially if the cost is less than the cost of keeping the
patient in a hospital bed.
6. Failure to report and disclose hospital discounts is a clear
violation of the provisions. If the hospital joins with another
to purchase equipment at less than the per unit price if each
facility had purchased the equipment on its own, this re-
duction must be reflected on the cost reports submitted to
Medicare or a violation exists.
7. Rebates for hospital group purchasing organizations are
questioned only as to the application and amount of the
administrative fee. These are situations where hospitals
band together to purchase in bulk at a reduced rate. As long
as cost is reflected in Medicare claims reports there is no
violation. The potential problem is the administrative fee
which could be viewed as an overt payment for goods for
which Medicare payment was made. However, the admin-
istrative fee, it can be argued, is not to induce referrals and
therefore is not a violation. Full disclosure should rectify
any perceived abuse.
25
8. The waiver of co-insurance and deductibles is considered by
some as an inducement to enter the health care system.
However, it is not considered fraud because it does not cost
the Medicare program additional dollars. On the other hand,
it does entice usage because it takes away the end-user's
requirement of putting their own money up front. This is a
tool to increase utilization. This could be viewed as "know-
ingly and willfully 26 soliciting Medicare patients to come
into the institution even though no cash changes hands.27
9. Spun-off hospital functions such as a Home Health Agency
doing discharge planning might result in a potential con-
flict. One could argue that the Medicare program is being
billed twice for the discharge-planning functions: once in
AM. Hosp. Assoc., supra note 15, at 15. Hospitals have been encouraged by
Congress to seek discounts when the results mean savings for both the Medicare
Program and patients.
26 42 U.S.C. § 1395 nn(b)(2).
2 Am. Hosp. Assoc., supra note 15, at 16. The law was so written as to dis-
courage overuse or abuse reasoning that a patient will think carefully before
putting themselves into a situation which will cost them substantial monies before
their insurance kicks in.
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the hospital's DRG payment which includes discharge plan-
ning and once for the home health agency's discharge plan-
ning because it is reimbursable through the home health
agency as well.
28
A problem still in need of resolution is a regulation designed to permit
a hospital to effect cost reduction or enhance revenue which does not
result in greater Medicare payments.
In 1985, the Inspector General of the Department of Health and Human
Services attempted to secure guarantees from the Department of Justice
that it would not prosecute certain health care marketing practices even
though such practices probably fell within the scope of the fraud and
abuse statutes. 29 The argument raised was that the practices did not harm
the federal government and, in fact, were cost-effective to both patient
and provider.30 The Department of Justice refused, claiming that doing
so would usurp Congress' express authority to make the laws of the land.31
If Congress deems conduct criminal, the Department of Justice does not
have the authority to legalize it.A
2
IV. CASE LAW
The fraud and abuse statutes have been fleshed out with case law. It
was the broad applicability of these statutes which generated the need
for some safe harbors.
Case law sheds light on some of the scenarios previously outlined. In
United States v. Duz-Mor Diagnostic Laboratory, Inc.,33 a proposal of a
fifteen percent rebate in exchange for Medicare and Medi-Cal3 4 business
constituted a bribe or kickback as outlined in federal statutes. In this
case, Duz-Mor was a clinical laboratory certified as a Medicare and Medi-
Cal provider. A Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) agent, posing as
a spokesman for potential nursing home investors, proposed to refer Med-
icare patient laboratory services to Duz-Mor for financial remuneration.
Duz-Mor characterized the taped conversation as preliminary negotia-
tions, not a bribe. The Court ruled that Duz-Mor's suggestion of a fifteen
percent rebate in exchange for Medicare referrals met the standards of
an offer of bribery. Similarly, in United States v. Fekri35 , an offer of a ten
8 Id. at 19-20.
- DEPT. HEALTH & HUM. SERV., HEALTH L. DIG. SuPP., pt. 1-2 (1985).
- Id., pt. 1 at 4.
31Id., pt. 2 at 2.
3 Id., pt 2 at 3.
U.S. v. Duz-Mor Diagnostic Laboratory, Inc., 650 F.2d 223 (9th Cir. 1981).(Fifteen percent rebate in exchange for Medicare business deemed a bribe or
kickback).
- Medi-Cal is the term used to designate the California medicaid program of
reimbursement for low-income families. California participates in the federal
Medicaid medical assistance through Medi-Cal. See 42 U.S.C. § 1392, et seq.
Funding is through the federal Dept. of Health & Human Services.
U.S. v. Fekri, 650 F.2d 1044 (9th Cir. 1981). (Rebate inducing laboratory
referrals constituted kickback).
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percent cash rebate on Medicare and Medi-Cal collections and discounts
on private pay patient's bills as an inducement to refer laboratory work
to National Lab was deemed a kickback scheme. This case, on appeal,
centered around the issue of entrapment. The court upheld the conviction
stating that the government did no more than create an atmosphere where
the defendant laboratory would feel comfortable discussing an illegal act.
A later case, United States v. Greber,36 was even more strict in its
determination that fraud was present even if only a portion of the pay-
ment to the physician was an inducement and the bulk of the payment
was compensation for professional services connected with tests per-
formed by the lab. In Greber, the defendant was an osteopathic physician,
board certified in cardiology. He formed Cardio-Med, a company which
provided diagnostic services to other physicians. One of these services
was the rental of a Holter-monitor, a device which records a patient's
cardiac activity over a 24-hour period. Cardio-Med billed Medicare for
the service and, when payment was received, forwarded a percentage to
the referring physician. The defendant argued these were merely inter-
pretation fees, and on appeal, argued that a professional services fee could
not be deemed Medicare fraud. The Court disagreed, holding that if only
one of the many purposes for the payment was to induce referrals, a
violation of the Medicare statute was achieved. The Court also noted that
kickbacks could take a number of forms other than cash, such as long-
term credit arrangements, gifts, supplies and equipment, and the fur-
nishing of business machines.
3 7
In United States v. Hancock,38 the Court specifically pointed out that
"the potential for increased costs to the. .. system.. . is plain" and "these
are among the evils Congress sought to prevent by enacting the kickback
statutes."39 Hancock revolved around payments made by chiropractors to
laboratories performing blood tests. The chiropractors claimed the monies
paid were handling fees for packaging, obtaining and delivering blood to
the labs and interpreting the results. The term "remuneration" was added
to the statute in the 1977 amendment to make it clear that even if the
action was not a "kickback" in the sense that no service was rendered,
payment could nevertheless violate the law.40
In another case, United States v. Porter,41 the 5th Circuit Court of
Appeals took a more narrow view of the term "kickback" and determined
that "remuneration" was not included therein. Subsequent courts have
viewed the more expansive language of the 1977 amendments to support
the Hancock interpretation that kickback and remuneration are both
36 U.S. v. Greber, 760 F.2d 68 (3d Cir. 1985). (Fraud present even if only a
portion of physician payment constituted inducement for referral).37 Id. at 71.
38 U.S. v. Hancock, 604 F.2d 999 (7th Cir. 1979) (Court cited potential for
increased costs one of the evils Congress was trying to prevent.)39Id. at 1001.
U.S. v. Greber, 760 F.2d 68,72 (1985).
41 U.S. v. Porter, 591 F.2d 1048 (5th Cir. 1979). (Court narrowed definition of
kickback to exclude "remuneration").
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included within the prohibitions of the act.42 Needless to say, this also
includes such practices as double billing (United States v. Lipkis).43 The
Lipkis case involved the referral of lab work from Mobile Medical Group,
a practice which provided mobile medical care to patients in halfway
houses in southern California. Most of the services went to Medicare and
Medi-Cal participants. Lipkis was charged with making a claim to Med-
icare for payment for blood handling services for which he had already
been paid by Automated Laboratory Services. The court found that Au-
tomated was paying a kickback for referrals and that Medicare was then
being billed a second time for the same services. Yet another example
can be found in Feiler v. New Jersey Dental Assoc.," a case involving
fraudulent billing practices where a dentist waived a patient's co-payment
when billing third-party payers and not disclosing the practice to the
insurance carrier. This practice was deemed fraudulent because by billing
for services at a rate higher than that which he actually charged his
patients, he caused the insurer to pay more than they would otherwise
be required to pay.45 In 1986, Griffin Hospital v. Commission on Hospitals
and Health Care,46 involved the appeal of a commission order to adopt a
budget which allegedly required it to use federal Medicare reimburse-
ments to subsidize the health care costs of non-Medicare patients.47 The
Court ruled that the purpose of the Medicare reimbursement system was
to control the cost of the Medicare program to the federal government
and to encourage hospitals to contain costs associated with Medicare
patients. The Court failed to find that a purpose of these statutes was to
42 See U.S. v. Tapert, 625 F.2d 111 (6th Cir. 1980). (Court of Appeals for Sixth
Circuit adopted the interpretation of "kickback" used in HANCOCK and rejected
that of PORTER).
43 U.S. v. Lipkis, 770 F.2d 1447 (9th Cir. 1985). (Court found Lipkis guilty of
double billing Medicare for blood handling services which had already been paid
for by laboratory).
Feiler v. New Jersey Dental Ass'n., 191 N.J. Super. 426, 467 A.2d 276 (1983).
(Court considered waiver of patient's co-payment fraudulent when Medicare billed
at higher rate).
45 If, in fact, an insurer only pays eighty percent of a charge and the dentist
indicates his bill is $100, then he can collect $80. But, if he has already shared
with the patient that he will accept eighty percent (or $80) as payment in full,
then the insurer should only be required to pay $64. And, if this is the rule, then
the Usual, Customary and Reasonable (UCR) fee is $80, not $100. The dentist
thereby offers "free" dentistry while competing dentists require a $20 co-payment.
A counter-argument that this billing method makes dental care more accessible
to low income families, reduces dental neglect and ultimately results in an overall
savings to insurers was deemed unsubstantiated and irrelevant by the Court. Id.
at 436.
" Griffin Hosp. v. Commission on Hosps. & Health Care, 200 Conn. 489, 512
A.2d 199 (1986).
" See id. at __, 512 A.2d at 203. The hospital, under the Prospective Payment
Plan, claimed to have earned a profit of $1,754,000 from the treatment of Medicare
patients during the 1984 fiscal year. The hospital claimed the Commission forced
it to subsidize the loss of $1,655,000 caring for non-Medicare patients with its
Medicare profits, thus depriving the hospital of the choice to use its Medicare
profits in a manner the hospital deemed appropriate.
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allow hospitals to "insulate" any profit made from treatment of Medicare
patients from the state. The Court ruled, in fact, that the recipient of the
funds may use the monies for any purpose, thus siding with the Com-
missioners.
Since Greber, three recent cases have supported stringent enforcement
of the anti-fraud amendments, indicating that Greber was not an aber-
ration. The intent to interpret the fraud and abuse laws broadly seems
clear. In United States v. Kats,4 a clinic owner was prosecuted for an
agreement with a laboratory to remit back to the clinic fifty percent of
the Medicare payments the lab received for services provided to patients
referred by the clinic. Kats argued, as did Greber, that the payments were
made as compensation for services rendered. The Court upheld Greber
stating that even if only one of several reasons for the payment was to
enhance referrals, it was fraudulent. In other words, payment must be
made for goods or services only.
In United States v. Bay State Ambulance,49 a hospital employee re-
sponsible for ambulance bids also had a financial relationship as a "con-
sultant" with one of the bidders, Bay State. The employee also argued
that payment was for services rendered. Here, as in Kats, the focus of the
case centered around the jury instruction. The trial court refused to in-
struct the jury that a guilty verdict could only be reached if the employee
compensation was "substantially over-paid." Instead, the court found the
test to be "intent" of the payments. When such consulting agreements
are not full time, very strict requirements become necessary to meet the
exemption from criminal liability.5 0 Finally, in Smith-Kline Beecham
Clinical Labs, three limited partnerships operated clinical labs in south-
ern California with over 100 physicians participating. Ultimately,
SmithKline Beecham agreed to a $1.5 million settlement rather than risk
being permanently excluded from Medicare/Medicaid.
51
The case law cited serves to point out that the government has a height-
ened concern relative to potential Medicare fraud and abuse violations.
Enforcement efforts have been stepped up, and appellate court decisions
have upheld these criminal convictions. Providers would be well-advised
to re-examine existing arrangements in light of the outcomes of recent
cases and should take these cases seriously when considering future ar-
rangements between providers of health care.
5 2
" U.S. v. Kats, 871 F.2d 105 (9th Cir. 1989). (Clinic owner guilty of fraud for
a 50% rebate scheme involving patient referral to laboratory by clinic).
'9 U.S. v. Bay State Ambulance, 874 F.2d 20 (1st Cir. 1989). (Court found intent
of employee compensation was to solicit business, not mere compensation for
services rendered).
w Id. at 31.
5' Address by Peter A. Pavarini, Soc'y Ohio Hosp. Atty's & Ohio Hosp. Assoc.,
74th Convention, Will Medicare/Medicaid Safe Harbor Rules Sink Hospital Joint
Ventures? (April 5, 1989).
52 Riley & Pristave, New Medicare Fraud and Abuse Court Cases, 3 NEPHROL-
OGY NEWS & IssuEs 8, 18 (August. 1989).
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V. PRESENT STATE OF AFFAIRS
The Greber decision and those which follow call into question long-
standing business arrangements in the health care system. Of late it has
become increasingly difficult to draw a meaningful line between legiti-
mate business arrangements and practices deemed fraudulent as a result
of the expansive language of the fraud and abuse statutes. Even legiti-
mate business practices might nevertheless increase utilization or be
considered payment for referrals-two activities the government wishes
to bar. New incentives in the health care market encourage hospital-
physician joint ventures. Yet this very alliance increases the likelihood
that the venturing physician will increase his utilization rate at the joint
venture hospital. Does this constitute fraud? There are two separate sub-
sections of the statute. The first limits remuneration to induce referral
of an individual and the second limits remuneration to induce the referral
of a service, such as laboratory work.5
In 1987, the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services
(HHS) was directed to specify various payment practices which should
not be viewed as kickbacks. 4 - This resulted in the Medicare and Medicaid
Patient & Program Protection Act of 1987.
The resulting regulations were referred to as safe harbor rules. These
rules were intended to guide providers and afford them a level of comfort
when engaging in business practices which Congress did not intend to
prohibit by the Anti-Kickback Statute.5 5 At the end of 1988, the Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services published the Safe Harbor Rules5 6
only to withdraw them five days later.57 A month later, HHS issued a
revised version of the rules, 5 but that draft is still awaiting approval by
the Department of Justice and the Office of Management and Budget. 9
The current draft of the regulations contains several recurring themes.
Major emphasis is placed on referring physicians not being reimbursed
for referrals. Secondly, remuneration may not exceed fair market value.
Finally, agreements between hospitals and physicians should be in writ-
ing and must last for no less than a year. Had these safe harbors been
in place, they could have afforded health care providers some comfort in
dealing with physicians and in their efforts to pursue joint ventures.
The Medicare Prospective Payment System, introduced in 1983, was
the first attempt to curtail the spiraling cost of health care by the federal
5 42 U.S.C. § 1396 h (b)(2)(A) and (b)(2)(B) (1985).
Medicare and Medicaid Patient and Program Protection Act of 1987. Pub.
L. 100-93, 101 Stat. 680 (1987).
Id.
85 53 Fed. Reg. 51856 (1988).
51 53 Fed. Reg. 52448 (1988).
5554 Fed. Reg. 3088 (1988).
59 Address by Peter Pavarini, Ohio Hosp. Assoc. & Soc'y Ohio Hosp. Attys.,
The Federal Self-Referral Prohibitions and How They Affect Ohio Providers (June
4,1989).
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government under the Medicare reimbursement system 0 For the first
time, hospitals, regardless of cost, were reimbursed by the Medicare pro-
gram at a predetermined rate.61 Those hospitals who could treat patients
with a particular ailment for less than the set rate would make money
and those hospitals who could not would lose money. Suddenly, hospitals
were being forced into a fiscal straight jacket that ignored all exceptions
and dismissed all excuses.62
It should have come as no surprise that hospitals began to shift their
emphasis from inpatient to outpatient services, using preadmission and
post-discharge services, developing community outreach programs and
strengthening referral patterns with physicians.63 To continue to serve
their patients and ensure financial survival, hospitals established formal
as well as informal linkages with physicians and other health care prov-
iders.64
At the present time, these very relationships are being scrutinized.
What hospitals thought to be legitimate business ventures are now subject
to restraints by fraud and abuse statutes.
While it is true that the government health insurance policy has in
general created cost-enhancing incentives, these recent regulatory efforts
have, by some estimates, cost the government an even greater amount.6 5
With every new governmental scheme to increase cost containment, there
have been corresponding adjustments made by providers of health care
institutions. Many of these maneuvers have been challenged by the fraud
statutes as violations. It appears that the provisions were not drafted
with the new competitive marketplace in mind. s Some of the new busi-
ness arrangements, encouraged by the prospective payment system, are
stymied by the broad language of the fraud and abuse statutes. This
uncertainty is breeding chaos in the health care industry and making
essential long term planning impossible.
- Social Security Amendments of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-21, 97 Stat. 65 (1983)
(replaced the retrospective cost-based reimbursement system with prospective
payment for all short term general hospitals).
61 Id. The prospective payment system categorized illnesses into 470 diagnostic
related groupings ("DRG"). A reimbursement rate was set by Medicare for pay-
ment to the provider hospital regardless of the actual cost to the health care
institution for providing that care.
61 Id. The goal was to make the cost of health care uniform throughout the
United States (with some regional cost-of-living differences) and to force hospitals
to reduce costs by refusing to reimburse at greater than the predetermined DRG
rate. Heretofore, hospitals were reimbursed by Medicare at their cost. This system,
Medicare argued, provided little incentive for hospitals to cut the ever increasing
cost of health care.
6 See generally Sullivan & Moore, supra note 1, at 66; MacKelvie & McGuire,
Fraud, Abuse & Inurement: The Growing Impact of Provider-Physician Relations,
23 J. HEALTH & HosP. L. 1 (1990).
64Id.
65McDowell, The Medicare-Medicaid Anti-Fraud & Abuse Amendments: Their
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Prior to Medicare legislation, enacted in 1965, was a thirty five year
period focused on public access to medical care much like the Hill Burton
Act's focus on ensuring the availability of health care facilities to all
citizenry.67 For some time, demand, not need, has been driving the system.
"When medical care is produced and sold in a market system, its distri-
bution parallels the class structure of society. Economic demands become
the basis for use, creating inequities in access to health care, whereas
equity would require that health need be the primary determinant of
use."68
Despite this fact, proponents of public health insurance have suffered
continuous defeat since the 1930's. In fact, Blue Cross was created by the
American Medical Association and American Hospital Association to de-
feat national health insurance.69 The Federal government basically ac-
cepted "the role of banker for the health system."70 This soon proved to
be an overwhelming burden and national health insurance continues to
be an issue today.
VI. PHYSICIAN RECRUITMENT
A hospital needs to attract and retain competent physicians to care for
patients requiring hospitalization. Physician recruitment practices are
one of the areas where safe harbors could have a positive impact on the
health care industry. A recent Jackson & Coker National survey of 788
hospitals showed that sixty percent of all hospitals recruit physicians.71
Therefore, the physician recruitment issue is one which should be on the
minds of over half of the hospitals in this country. Recruitment can take
on many forms, but generally it encompasses the following areas: income
or revenue guarantees, loans or loan guarantees, assistance in practice
management, consultation or marketing, referral programs, assistance
with relocation and financial assistance in the form of grant or loan
forgiveness, signing bonuses, or contracts for administrative services.72
However, despite the fact that sixty percent of the hospitals recruit
physicians and that half a dozen forms of questionable recruitment tech-
niques exist, no regulations were contained in the January 23, 1989 pro-
posed safe harbor regulations. 73 Drafts of this legislation carried the
Hospital Survey & Construction (Hill Burton) Act, 42 U.S.C. § 291 (1982
and Supp. V. 1987); 42 C.F.R. § 124 (1989). In 1946 Congress passed the original
Hill Burton Hospital Construction Act which provided money for hospital con-
struction in order to increase hospital bed capacity.
Brown, Medicare and Medicaid: The Process, Value, and Limits of Health
Care Reforms, 4 J. PUB. HEALTH POLY 335, 336 (1983).
69 McDowell, supra note 65 at 694.
TI Id. at 694-695.
71 Address by Gary Eiland & Douglas Mancino, Am. Acad. Hosp. Atty's & Am.
Hosp. Assoc. Hospital Physician Transactions - The New and Evolving Regulatory
Environment (1989) [hereinafter Eiland].72 Id. at 2.
73 Id. at 4.
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following conditions: (1) Benefits cannot be conditioned on referral of
patients to the recruiting facility; (2) Benefits cannot be given for more
than two years and no re-negotiation is permitted during that time; (3)
The recruiting hospital cannot bar a physician from establishing privi-
leges at another health care facility; (4) If the agreement includes the
payment of malpractice insurance, that coverage cannot be limited to
coverage solely of the recruiting hospital; and (5) Hospitals may not re-
cruit a physician who has been practicing in the hospital service area for
more than one year.
74
Since drafts included these restrictions and the final proposed regu-
lations did not contain a physician recruitment safe harbor, how are
hospitals to know what conduct is acceptable and what is not? Incon-
sistencies abound. An example of these inconsistencies is that the Office
of Program Integrity (OPI) states that payment to a hospital to promote
the utility of hospital services is not illegal if the amount of payment is
not related to the number of patient admissions or tied to a requirement
that physicians admit to that hospital.76 The Internal Revenue Service
(IRS), on the other hand, takes the position that a physician recruitment
subsidy is not considered private inurement if the subsidy is reasonable
and linked to the value of the contribution the physician will make to
the hospital.7 6 It almost becomes a question of which agency is better to
offend, the Justice Department, the IRS, the OIG or the Office of Program
Integrity. Prudent health care administrators should choose none of the
above. Certainly the IRS would not be the offended agency of choice.
Problems with the IRS can jeopardize the tax exempt status of the hos-
pital. The physician involved can also have income tax implications. Fur-
ther, tax problems may affect future relationships among parties. If a
hospital is a tax exempt charity under 501(c)(3),7 7 it may jeopardize its
tax exempt status by recruiting physicians. To maintain a tax exempt
status, a hospital must prove a charitable purpose, a public purpose and
show that no earnings from the institution inures to any private share-
holders or individuals.7 8 It is not always clear which approach the IRS
will use - the benefit to the community analysis or the private benefit
analysis.
Two cases, one in 1980 and one in 1989, look at the qualitative versus
the quantitative aspects of this issue, American Campaign Academy v.
Commissioner7 9 and Western Catholic Church v. Commissioner 80 In both,
74 Id.
75 Id. at5.
76 Id. at 7.
77 I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (1986). See supra note 21.
78 Sullivan supra note 3, at 67.
79 American Campaign Academy v. Commissioner, 92 T.C. No. 66 (1989).
(Private benefit must be minimal after considering public benefit conferred).
80 Western Catholic Church v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 196 (1979), 631 F.2d 736
(1980) (Cannot be a substantial non-exempt purpose and remain 501(c)(3)).
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the IRS was unconvinced by written agreements and looked to the actions
of the entities to determine fitness. Both quantity and quality are nec-
essary to benefit from tax exemption. In a private ruling, the IRS looked
to the needs of the community.8' In addition, the IRS has consistently
allowed greater latitude with rural communities where it is more difficult
to recruit and retain physicians.8 2 Some recruitment incentives have been
allowed by the IRS, but again the issue is a lack of clear-cut guidelines
which results in a chilling effect on all recruitment because no health
care institution wants to jeopardize their 501(c)(3) status.
VII. JoN- VENTURES
In reviewing joint ventures, the IRS evaluates involvement of the
501(c)(3) charity with taxable entities by considering in general whether
the hospital's charitable purposes will be compromised. All facts and
circumstances are reviewed. There is no per se loss of status. Some factors
considered include: (1) Is there a substantial furtherance of purposes; (2)
Does participation as a general partner create a conflict between 501(c)(3)
obligation under the state partnership law to benefit the financial inter-
ests of the other partners versus an obligation under 501(c)(3) to effect
charitable goals.a3
In 1982, the IRS stated that the exempt organization must be the sole
managing partner or take a totally passive role." More recently (1986)
a 501(c)(3) organization was allowed a more active role if the terms of
the relationship insulated the general partner from any obligation in
conflict with exempt goals.85 Another factor is whether the terms of the
agreement protect the financial interests of the 501(c)(3) charity against
greater benefits flowing to the non-exempt partners.- In all of these
factors, the threshold consideration remains: what is the relationship
between the related purpose and the exempt purpose.
In all fairness, it is the very aspects of joint ventures most attractive
to health care institutions that are aspects which represent the greatest
risk of exposure under Medicare and Medicaid fraud and abuse. By joining
forces, the members of a joint venture secure increased access to the
market and increase the potential of their collective profitability. This
profitability sometimes translates into increased utilization of health care
services and expenses accruing to the Federal Government via Medicare
and Medicaid. One of the major reasons for safe harbor rules is to make
81 Eiland, supra note 71.
82 See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 73-313, 1973-2 C.B. 174, which justifies lower than market
rentals in isolated rural areas.
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it more difficult to assert a defense of inadequate intent. Defendants must
"knowingly and willfully" participate in the activity.8 7 Therefore, if pros-
ecuted for this offense, prosecution must feel that they have proof of clear
intent, thus making ignorance a more difficult defense.
Clearly there is a trend toward greater enforcement. All the focus and
interest on this aspect of Medicare and Medicaid reimbursement shows
that the Federal Government is serious about its efforts to squeeze out
all "fat" in the system.
Some experts are advising health care administrators to brace them-
selves for possible challenges to their tax-exempt status."" Challenges
may come from national, state or local levels for hospitals to show that
their charitable and community services in some way compensate for tax
dollars forgone by the community.
Senator Edward Roybal (California) has recently reintroduced a bill
which requires hospitals to provide uncompensated care equal to at least
fifty percent of the value of their tax exemption.8 9
Advice on meeting this challenge to tax-exempt status includes know-
ing the law and documenting services. Industry leaders suggest the cre-
ation of a charity care policy, two years of free care documentation which
includes the ability to separate out bad debt from charity care, the re-
alistic assignment of a value to services rendered and, finally, commu-
nicating those services and the price for providing them, to the community
the hospital serves. 90 A recent consumer study of hospitals shows the
public's perception of hospitals is hazy. A majority of consumers do not
think hospitals are charitable organizations. If left uncorrected, these
misconceptions can erode hospitals' standing with lawmakers.9 1 For ex-
ample, according to a survey of 1,000 households nationwide, more than
seventy percent say that the government and taxpayers pay for charity
care while only 2.6 percent say that it is the hospitals which pay for the
uninsured.9 2 There is much work to be done to underscore the identity of
the not-for-profit hospital.
VIII. STARK BILL
A recent proposal toward even more stringent control of hospitals comes
from HR. 939 sponsored by Peter Stark.93 This bill would increase the
scope of activities subject to penalties and would impose additional re-
11 42 U.S.C. § 1395 nn(b)(2).
Lumsdon, Pressure Growing In The Fight to Stay Tax Exempt, HEALTHCARE
FINANCIL MGMT, Jan. 1991, at 21 [hereinafter Lumsdon].
89 News at Deadline, HosPITALs, March 5, 1991, at 8.
90 Lumsdon, supra note 88, at 24-25.
"1 Hospitals Tackle Image Problems at Many Levels, HosprALs, March 5, 1991,
at 24.92 Id.
91 CEOs Cautioned to Watch Stark's Referral Bill, HospITALS, Jan. 20, 1989, at
60 [hereinafter CEOs Cautioned].
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strictions on safe harbors when physician referrals are involved. Safe
harbors would remain the same for non-physician activities. In a joint
venture, (1) hospitals would have to have a valid business purpose, (2)
the joint venture would have to involve risk, that is, not be a "sure deal"
participation in a joint venture because of a decline in referrals, (5) there
must be a good-faith disclosure to patients or patrons so that they are
aware of the relationship between the parties and (6) the joint venture
must serve only non-medicare and non-medicaid patients.9 4 Yet another
condition to the Stark Bill would restrict how payments would be made.
The conditions require the services actually be performed, that these
services would be performed even without the joint venture, and that the
person performing the service must be right for the job - that is to prevent
a physician from perhaps performing a billing function.9 5 Further, the
payment to the physician must not be contingent on referrals, and finally,
the payment must be the equivalent of fair market value.96 The Stark
Bill would most certainly insure that the distribution of profits would not
be linked with referrals.9 7 Clearly there is a commitment to rout-out and
eliminate sweetheart deals between hospitals and select physicians who
effectively control the flow of services to patients and over-use the services
in the process. Stark's Bill, entitled the Ethics in Patient Referrals Act,
has placed the health care community on notice that abuses will not be
condoned. However, Stark has been accused of "basically working back-
ward" for the sake of discussion.99 All agree, however, that the key is to
produce a bill narrowly worded so as to only reach abusive situations and
not unduly curtail legitimate referrals which result in the continuity of
care and serve patients' best interests. Stark focused on diagnostic and
therapeutic radiology, clinical laboratories, durable medical equipment
and home health care in his introductory comments regarding the bill. g9
The original draft also seemed to be overbroad in that it would restrict
a physician referral to an entity which paid that physician more than
$10,000 annually. This would prevent a medical director of a radiology
department from referring a patient to his own employer-hospital. Most
would agree that this is stringent. However, rules must certainly clarify
the enormous gray area which is between what is clearly allowable and
what is not.
Stark's very goal is to provide a bright-line rule which would restrict
almost all Medicare referrals by physicians who had an interest in the
provider receiving the referral. Stark seems to feel that the Government
" Address by Peter A. Pavarini, Soc'y Ohio Hosp. Atty's & Ohio Hosp. Assoc.
Convention, Will Medicare/Medicaid Safe Harbor Rules Sink Hospital Joint Ven-
tures? (June 4, 1990).
95 Id. at 20.
SId.
97Id.
- CEO's Cautioned, supra note 93, at 60.
g Id.
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is a victim of clever deal-makers who have circumvented more generic
statutes by simply disguising their schemes as legitimate business ar-
rangements, also known as joint ventures.1°° Stark sees three major evils
lurking in these cozy arrangements. First, the physician may not refer
the patient to the health care facility that will offer the patient the best
care. Second, the interested physician may refer the patient for costly
unnecessary services which increase Medicare costs. Finally, Stark insists
that honest competition is thwarted when hidden payments become a cost
of doing business. A further fear is that charitable assets could be diverted
to the physician and no longer be available to serve the institution's stated
charitable purpose.10'
Some find appeal in the bright-line approach, which explains what one
can and cannot do in relatively straight forward terms and which would
affect all equally. It appears that the more devious the hospital, the more
protection it receives from the murky statutes on the books today. This
could save hospitals from their stiffest competition of all, physician-owned
entities.102
Only a narrow substitute provision of the Stark Bill was enacted in
1989. Effective January 1, 1992, referrals to clinical laboratories where
the referring physician has a relationship, will be prohibited. Also, all
providers of Medicare services must have reported to the Secretary by
December 19, 1990, all ownership arrangements connected to referring
physicians. In addition, all Medicare Part B claims must carry the name
and provider number of the physician. This allows a data base to be
compiled of all physician ownership. The Comptroller General was to
report the results of such a study to Congress by February 1, 1991.103
Undaunted, it is possible that Congressman Stark will reintroduce the
portions of his bill that were not included in the budget reconciliation
agreement because he believes that doctors continue to reap benefits from
Medicare due to unnecessary care referred to facilities where they enjoy
part-ownership."' Some would argue these restrictions infringe upon phy-
sicians' right to contract and their freedom of association. Stark assumes
doctors will put their ethics on a shelf when it comes to ownership in-
terests. This certainly is not true throughout the industry, but specific
guidelines could go a long way to remove those lingering doubts about
referrals and the true need for services rendered.
IX. TAx IssuEs
The hottest issue at present seems to be physician recruitment by tax-
exempt providers. Once the IRS and OIG begin to share information
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between potential violations of the fraud and abuse regulations and tax-
exempt status rules, the charitable aspect of health care organizations
will be examined under a microscope. Any private benefit accruing to an
individual as a result of the 501(c)(3) charitable organization must be
incidental to an overriding public benefit. Siice 1909 there has been a
statutory prohibition against inurement of net earnings from not-for-
profit corporations to private individuals. This is so because financial
benefit is deemed the same thing as the exercise of control.105
The IRS has long considered hospitals as "physicians' workshops", 1°6
and as such, imputes a certain degree of personal interest in the hospital
to the doctor. This must be offset by the benefit realized by both the
hospital and the community from physicians who practice near the hos-
pital. The IRS has divided its view of these relationships and sees "benign"
bonding relationships acceptable because they support the hospital's goal
of efficient use of resources. The other view places the hospital in jeopardy
if the physician is deemed to possess a relationship found to be of private
benefit. 0
7
The IRS employs a test comprised of three prongs to decide the effects
on the tax-exempt hospital: (1) Does the partnership serve a charitable
purpose, (2) Does the partnership allow the hospital to further its exempt
purpose; and (3) Does the agent confer benefits to for-profit persons.1a8
In reviewing a hospital's tax exempt status, one must keep in mind
that the providing of health care is not a criteria listed to support 501(c)(3)
status. Tax exempt standards were not even established until 1956.1°9
Noteworthy in those initial requirements was the mandate that the hos-
pital must be operated to the extent of its financial ability for those not
able to pay for the services rendered. This became known as the "financial
ability standard" 0 and reflected the IRS' position that providing health
care, per se, was not a charitable act. To be charitable, the hospital had
to provide uncompensated care. The rule was found difficult to apply and
in 1959 the regulations were altered to expand the term "charitable" to
include purposes established by judicial decision."' In 1969, yet another
standard was substituted: the "community benefit standard"" 2 which rec-
ognized the principle that health care is a charitable purpose in and of
itself. This removed the requirement of providing uncompensated care.
Today the community benefit standard applies. It is not considered to
be met when a substantial portion of a community's residents are turned
away if unable to pay. This has basically translated into a requirement
of operating an emergency room open to all, regardless of ability to pay." 2




- See Rev. Rul. 56-185, 1956-1 C.B. 202.
110 Sullivan, supra note 3, at 67.
III Id.
12 Rev. Rul. 69-545, 1969-2 C.B. 117.
" Sullivan, supra note 3, at 69.
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This is essential because many indigents cannot afford private physicians
and an emergency room is their sole access to medical care.
Another community benefit requirement is non-discrimination of Med-
icare and Medicaid patients. 114 If a hospital has a policy of turning away
Medicaid patients because reimbursement is inadequate, the question
can be raised as to whether it is in fact operating its hospital for the
benefit of the community.
There is currently a blurring in some people's minds between non-profit
and for-profit hospitals. In fact, Congress has requested that a study be
performed by the General Accounting Office (GAO) to compare relative
community benefit between tax exempt and for-profit hospitals.115 Based
upon those results, the criteria necessary for hospitals to maintain their
tax exempt status may become more stringent.
Hospitals need not stand idly by awaiting the outcome of the GAO
study. The mandate appears clear: not-for-profit hospitals must provide
enough community service to justify their tax-exempt status or convert
to for-profit before that very result is thrust upon them."
6
Yet another regulatory action was introduced by the Office of the In-
spector General (OIG) in a report to Congress entitled Financial Ar-
rangements Between Physicians and Health Care Business.1 7 Over 1,100
health care providers were included and the results do not bode well for
relaxing the regulations which target joint ventures. Among the findings
were the confirmation that many physicians do have an interest in the
health care entity to which they refer their patients and some physicians,
in fact, own such entities. Even more revealing is the finding that patients
of physicians who own or have a financial interest in laboratories receive
more services than the average Medicare patient." 8 In 1986-1988, the
OIG initiated 442 cases under the anti-kickback provisions of the Fraud
and Abuse Statute. Over 300 involved one investigation in Philadel-
phia.1' 9
The OIG also sent to 1.5 million health care providers a "Fraud Alert"
which described features of joint ventures which were considered suspi-
cious under the Fraud and Abuse Statute. It even included a hot line
number. Suspicious features were divided into three areas as they per-
tained to investors, business structures and financing, and profit distri-
bution. 120
114 Id.
115 Id. at 70.
116 Id.
17 Off. Insp. Gen., U.S. Dept. Health & Human Serv. (CCH) para. 37, 838 (May
1989).
- Peregrine & Nodzenski, Expanded Enforcement of the Fraud & Abuse Laws,
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At the Fifth Annual Health Care Tax Law Institute on May 2, 1989, an
Assistant Chief Counsel for the IRS announced that the IRS and OIG
will begin cooperating in an effort to identify areas of mutual concern
relative to not-for-profit health care providers. 121 Finally, the General
Accounting Office issued a report in June of 1989 to the House Committee
on Ways and Means which appeared to mirror the conclusions arrived at
by the Office of Inspector General.122
X. EVOLUTION OF HEALTH CARE POLICY
The need for across-the-board access to health care is again on the
agenda of state and federal legislators. Competitive pressures, along with
the regulatory changes, have all but forced physicians and hospitals to
band together. 23 Unfortunately, these new relationships result in shared
assets which raise tax as well as public policy issues, because a hospital's
future is so inexorably tied to its medical staff. Informed estimates place
seventy to eighty percent of all health care expenditures under the control
of physicians.'2 This is why hospitals continually strive to recruit and
retain the best possible physicians. Much of the present concern surrounds
the fear that these hospital-physician arrangements make it difficult to
ensure that charitable assets are used for the public purposes so in-
tended.125
Now concern is enhanced because of the expanded authority of the
Department of Health and Human Services. The 1987 Medicare and Med-
icaid Patient and Program Protection Act 26 provided for civil sanctions.
Many arrangements were protected in the past because they were not
deemed severe enough to necessitate criminal prosecution. Now, the
Health and Human Services Secretary cannot only prosecute a health
care provider but can exclude that provider from participating in Medi-
care and Medicaid. 127
The problem with joint ventures, regardless of whether they involve
inpatient care activity, is the motivation for the joint venture. When the
hospital engages in a joint venture to maintain physician loyalty, that
translates into an effort to ensure continued referrals. This, in turn,
suggests the presence of inurement to the physician. Hospitals generally
counter with the argument that physicians provide the necessary capital
to finance the operation. However, most physician-hospital joint ventures
are not capital intensive. In many cases involving sophisticated equip-
ment, the manufacturer ensures financing. 28
121 Id.
122 Id.
- McDowell, supra note 65, at 692.
124 See Eisenberg, supra note 1 (estimating physicians control up to 80% of
health care expenditures). See also, Porn, The Medical Staff Development Plan,
16 Top HEALTH CARE FIN., 77 (1990).
121 Sullivan, supra note 3.
'26 Pub. L. No. 100-93, 101 Stat. 680 (1987).
27 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320a-7(b)(7) (West Supp. 1989).
128 Sullivan. supra note 3, at 77.
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Most joint ventures, despite protestations to the contrary, are based on
fear. The fear is that the physician will move to a competing hospital and
take all of his referrals along as well. So, despite warnings to the contrary,
hospitals continue to joint venture, hoping that they will escape the ever
widening net being cast by the IRS and its companion regulatory agencies.
One bright spot is Plumstead Theatre Society v. Commissioner,'" in
which the tax court held that the Society was exempt notwithstanding
its general partnership in a limited partnership along with private in-
dividuals as well as a for-profit organization. 13 0 However, the IRS looks
carefully at private benefit in a joint venture between taxable and non-
taxable parties. The stakes remain high with the price being the loss of
the hospital's tax exempt status.
The IRS seems to have established two categories of review: one a
threshold question, the other a more in-depth review. The threshold ques-
tion is "whether participation by the exempt entity furthers its exempt
purposes. 113 Second, the IRS closely examines the arrangement to see if
it allows the not-for-profit entity to exclusively further its stated exempt
purpose. The IRS looks for improper safety provisions against financial
loss or financial gain.
There are five examples of ventures the IRS would not approve: (1) new
obligations in conflict with not-for-profit purpose, (2) disproportionate
shifting of profits or losses to the for-profit partners, in this case physi-
cians, (3) a not-for-profit entity making unreasonable loans to the joint
venture (i.e. unsecured or below market interest rate), (4) a not-for-profit
entity turning over assets for less than fair market value or (5) the phy-
sician receiving the lion's share of the profits.13 2
While these examples are somewhat illuminating, they still must be
viewed under tax laws as well as fraud and abuse laws and this is where
things become confusing. The question becomes, "how much is too much?"
Clearly, direct payments for referrals is prohibited, but the industry is
currently so enmeshed in this joint venture scenario that it is almost
impossible to stop. Since all hospitals are fighting for survival, each hos-
pital fears that its refusal to play along with all the other hospitals in
trying to bond physicians to them will result in their hospital being the
one to close its doors. The ultimate victim of this problem is the health
care system itself.
- Plumstead Theatre Society v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 1324 (1980), affd per
curiam, 675 F.2d 244 (9th Cir. 1982) (Court held Society exempt as general partner
in limited partnership with private individuals and for-profit organization).
130 Id.
131 Sullivan, supra note 3, at 77.
132 Id. at 78.
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XI. CONCLUSION
It is anticipated that once safe harbor regulations are published, en-
forcement will increase. Certain agencies are already revising guidelines
to instruct their staffs more clearly. Meanwhile, the intertwining of fraud
and abuse law with tax law has become the focus of the IRS and the
Department of Health and Human Services. These agencies will certainly
develop opportunities to share information.
One area deserving of close attention is the community benefit standard
under which hospitals qualify as a 501(c)(3) charitable organization. Hos-
pitals must benefit the entire community or risk the loss of their exempt
status. Further, the IRS code is designed to protect a hospital's charitable
assets. If there is any question that these assets are being diverted to
private interests, the IRS will not allow it.
The past decade has been unkind to non-profit hospitals. Charitable
contributions have diminished, cost-shifting to payers has been curtailed
and cost-based reimbursement instituted. This, along with a general
decline of in-patient services, has forced hospitals to compete with each
other, physicians and free-standing facilities. This new environment has
caused hospitals to adapt by recruiting, retaining and rewarding physi-
cians and the patient base which they control. It is clear that only the
strongest and most efficient hospitals will survive. The Prospective Pay-
ment System encourages hospitals to see more patients in their hospital
while providing them fewer services over a shorter period of time.
It is estimated that over sixty percent of privately insured Americans
are covered by managed care plans (HMO's, PPO's and fee-for-service
requiring pre-authorization for admission).133 This leaves very few "full
pay" patients left. In 1988, the average hospital's operating margin
shrank by fifty percent from the year before to five percent in the first
half of 1988.134 All agree that hospitals are now paying the piper for the
building boom of the 1960's and early 1970's. Many hospitals that have
recently closed cite several reasons including declining admissions due
to lack of physician referral, a change in patient preference, increased
patient mobility, declining revenue, uncompensated care burden, rising
costs of plant maintenance, cost of new technology and nursing short-
age. 13 5
Not only must hospitals cut costs, they must increase revenue. That
often translates into improving market share. Hospitals have been threat-
ened by physician groups developing their own joint ventures and si-
phoning off profitable treatment programs like radiology. Hospitals have
banded together thinking there is safety and strength in numbers. Mean-
while, physicians have not been curtailed as hospitals have. They still
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In this area, a not-for-profit hospital has a special burden. For a hospital
to survive, it must at least achieve the following:
First, there must be complete documentation. This ensures that the
correct questions are asked in the first place and shows the government
that every option was fully reviewed.
Second, the Board of Trustees must have the correct and necessary
information to make an informed decision, be it on recruitment, retention
or joint ventures.
Third, in a physician relationship of any kind, the hospital must em-
phasize the program benefits to the hospital and to the community. This
must occur without any unreasonable benefits flowing to the physician.
Fourth, the hospital must de-emphasize the benefits to the physician
via loans versus income guarantees, for example. There is also a three
year maximum on benefits for new doctors under the proposed safe har-
bors. 136
Fifth, care in joint ventures must be exercised. There must be a bona
fide business purpose, and investors must be chosen for reasons other
than their ability to refer. All parties must have duties and responsibil-
ities similar to a real business arrangement. Physicians cannot be given
a small risk or be guaranteed a lopsided large return. All dividends must
be based on investment units, and not on referrals. Most importantly, the
hospital must keep an eye out for the IRS. 3 7 It also helps to document
the community need for the physicians. Safe harbor regulations require
all agreements be in writing. Things become infinitely easier if the phy-
sician is an employee rather than an independent contractor. A bona fide
employment relationship precludes a private benefit issue. Compensation
must still be reasonable, however, to avoid problems.
Be reminded also that the actions of an affiliate can be imputed to the
parent, so a separate corporation does not necessarily insulate the hos-
pital. In other words, a hospital cannot with impunity do indirectly what
it cannot do directly.
In conclusion, safe harbor regulations have failed to produce clear an-
swers and guidance to hospitals. In two critical areas, physician recruit-
ment and joint venturing, hospitals may be vulnerable because of their
major reason for striking such deals: to induce referrals. However, there
is still room for recruitment and joint ventures which are beneficial to
patients and cost effective. In physician recruitment, hospitals must iden-
tify a valid business purpose for their recruitment program. If no referrals
are required to be made to the recruiting institution, and a valid business
purpose is shown, it will be difficult to show abuse.
136 MacKelvie, supra note 9, at 7.
137 Id.
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Similarly, joint ventures must be proven to do more than enrich those
who control the flow of patients and services. A hospital must make sure
to impose a reasonable level of risk on the physician in a joint venture.
Perhaps the most critical element is in the payment structure. Payments
must be made on the basis of ownership interests.
More uncertainty is sure to follow, even after the long awaited enact-
ment of the Safe Harbor regulations. The industry must sensitize itself
to these issues in anticipation of greater scrutiny to come.
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